ACO-ACE ALLIANCE – ASCENSION CENTER CHURCH – 2016
Theresa J Morris
Bill M Tracer
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Thomas A. Sinisi
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First Amendment to the United States Constitution
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The First Amendment (Amendment I) to the United States Constitution prohibits the making of any law respecting an establishment of religion, impeding the free exercise of religion, abridging the freedom of speech, infringing on the freedom of the press, interfering with the right to peaceably assemble or prohibiting the petitioning for a governmental redress of grievances. It was adopted on December 15, 1791, as one of the ten amendments that constitute the Bill of Rights.
The Bill of Rights was originally proposed as a measure to assuage Anti-Federalist opposition to Constitutional ratification. Initially, the First Amendment applied only to laws enacted by the Congress, and many of its provisions were interpreted more narrowly than they are today. Beginning with Gitlow v. New York (1925), the Supreme Court applied the First Amendment to states—a process known as incorporation—through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Everson v. Board of Education (1947), the Court drew on Founding Father Thomas Jefferson’s correspondence to call for “a wall of separation between church and State”, though the precise boundary of this separation remains in dispute. Speech rights were expanded significantly in a series of 20th and 21st-century court decisions which protected various forms of political speech, anonymous speech, campaign financing, pornography, and school speech; these rulings also defined a series of exceptions to First Amendment protections. The Supreme Court overturned English common law precedent to increase the burden of proof fordefamation and libel suits, most notably in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). Commercial speech, however, is less protected by the First Amendment than political speech, and is therefore subject to greater regulation.
The Free Press Clause protects publication of information and opinions, and applies to a wide variety of media. In Near v. Minnesota(1931) and New York Times v. United States (1971), the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protected against prior restraint—pre-publication censorship—in almost all cases. The Petition Clause protects the right to petition all branches and agencies of government for action. In addition to the right of assembly guaranteed by this clause, the Court has also ruled that the amendment implicitly protects freedom of association.
3Establishment of religion
4Free exercise of religion
5Freedom of speech
5.1Speech critical of the government
5.1.1World War I
5.2.4Falsifying military awards
5.6Memoirs of convicted criminals
6Freedom of the press
7Petition and assembly
8Freedom of association
The Bill of Rights in theNational Archives
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Main article: Anti-Federalism
In 1776, the second year of the American Revolutionary War, the Virginia colonial legislature passed a Declaration of Rights that included the sentence “The freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic Governments.” Eight of the other thirteen states made similar pledges. However, these declarations were generally considered “mere admonitions to state legislatures”, rather than enforceable provisions.
James Madison, drafter of the Bill of Rights
After several years of comparatively weak government under the Articles of Confederation, a Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia proposed a new constitution on September 17, 1787, featuring among other changes a stronger chief executive. George Mason, a Constitutional Convention delegate and the drafter of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, proposed that the Constitution include a bill of rights listing and guaranteeing civil liberties. Other delegates—including future Bill of Rights drafter James Madison—disagreed, arguing that existing state guarantees of civil liberties were sufficient and that any attempt to enumerate individual rights risked the implication that other, unnamed rights were unprotected. After a brief debate, Mason’s proposal was defeated by a unanimous vote of the state delegations.
For the constitution to be ratified, however, nine of the thirteen states were required to approve it in state conventions. Opposition to ratification (“Anti-Federalism”) was partly based on the Constitution’s lack of adequate guarantees for civil liberties. Supporters of the Constitution in states where popular sentiment was against ratification (including Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York) successfully proposed that their state conventions both ratify the Constitution and call for the addition of a bill of rights. The U.S. Constitution was eventually ratified by all thirteen states. In the 1st United States Congress, following the state legislatures’ request, James Madison proposed twenty constitutional amendments, which were then condensed to twelve and forwarded to the states. Ten of these were ratified and became the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment passed the House and Senate with almost no recorded debate, complicating future discussion of the Amendment’s intent. The First Amendment (along with the rest of the Bill of Rights) was submitted to the states for ratification on September 25, 1789, and adopted on December 15, 1791.
Establishment of religion
Main article: Establishment Clause
Thomas Jefferson wrote with respect to the First Amendment and its restriction on the legislative branch of the federal government in an 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists (a religious minority concerned about the dominant position of the Congregationalist church in Connecticut):
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”, thus building a wall of separation between Church & State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
In Reynolds v. United States (1878) the Supreme Court used these words to declare that “it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere [religious] opinion, but was left free to reach [only those religious] actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.” Quoting from Jefferson’s Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom the court stated further in Reynolds:
In the preamble of this act [. . .] religious freedom is defined; and after a recital ‘that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty’, it is declared ‘that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere [only] when [religious] principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order.’ In these two sentences is found the true distinction between what properly belongs to the church and what to the State.
Originally, the First Amendment applied only to the federal government, and some states continued official state religions after ratification. Massachusetts, for example, was officially Congregationalist until the 1830s. In Everson v. Board of Education (1947), the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause (i.e., made it apply against the states). In the majority decision, Justice Hugo Black wrote:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion to another . . . in the words of Jefferson, the [First Amendment] clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State’ . . . That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.
In Torcaso v. Watkins (1961), the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution prohibits states and the federal government from requiring any kind of religious test for public office. In the Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet (1994), Justice David Souter, writing for the majority, concluded that “government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.” In a series of cases in the first decade of the 2000s—Van Orden v. Perry (2005), McCreary County v. ACLU (2005), andSalazar v. Buono (2010)—the Court considered the issue of religious monuments on federal lands without reaching a majority reasoning on the subject.
U.S. President Thomas Jeffersonwrote in his correspondence of “a wall of separation between church and State”.
Everson used the metaphor of a wall of separation between church and state, derived from the correspondence of President Thomas Jefferson. It had been long established in the decisions of the Supreme Court, beginning with Reynolds v. United States in 1879, when the Court reviewed the history of the early Republic in deciding the extent of the liberties of Mormons. Chief Justice Morrison Waite, who consulted the historian George Bancroft, also discussed at some length the Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessmentsby James Madison, who drafted the First Amendment; Madison used the metaphor of a “great barrier”.
Justice Hugo Black adopted Jefferson’s words in the voice of the Court. The Court has affirmed it often, with majority, but not unanimous, support. Warren Nord, in Does God Make a Difference?, characterized the general tendency of the dissents as a weaker reading of the First Amendment; the dissents tend to be “less concerned about the dangers of establishment and less concerned to protect free exercise rights, particularly of religious minorities.”
Beginning with Everson, which permitted New Jersey school boards to pay for transportation to parochial schools, the Court has used various tests to determine when the wall of separation has been breached. Everson laid down the test that establishment existed when aid was given to religion, but that the transportation was justifiable because the benefit to the children was more important. In the school prayer cases of the early 1960s, (Engel v. Vitale and Abington School District v. Schempp), aid seemed irrelevant; the Court ruled on the basis that a legitimate action both served a secular purpose and did not primarily assist religion. In Walz v. Tax Commission (1970), the Court ruled that a legitimate action could not entangle government with religion; in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), these points were combined into the Lemon test, declaring that an action was an establishment if:
1. the statute (or practice) lacked a secular purpose;
2. its principal or primary effect advanced or inhibited religion; or
3. it fostered an excessive government entanglement with religion.
The Lemon test has been criticized by justices and legal scholars, but it remains the predominant means by which the Court enforces the Establishment Clause. In Agostini v. Felton (1997), the entanglement prong of the Lemon test was demoted to simply being a factor in determining the effect of the challenged statute or practice. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), the opinion of the Court considered secular purpose and the absence of primary effect; a concurring opinion saw both cases as having treated entanglement as part of the primary purpose test. Further tests, such as the endorsement test and coercion test, have been developed to determine whether a government action violated the Establishment Clause.
In Lemon the Court stated that that the separation of church and state could never be absolute: “Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable”, the court wrote. “Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a ‘wall’, is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.”
Accommodationists, in contrast, argue along with Justice William O. Douglas that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being”. This group holds that the Lemon test should be applied selectively. As such, for many conservatives, the Establishment Clause solely prevents the establishment of a state church, not public acknowledgements of God nor “developing policies that encourage general religious beliefs that do not favor a particular sect and are consistent with the secular government’s goals.”
Free exercise of religion
Main article: Free Exercise Clause
“Freedom of religion means freedom to hold an opinion or belief, but not to take action in violation of social duties or subversive to good order.” In Reynolds v. United States(1878), the Supreme Court found that while laws cannot interfere with religious belief and opinions, laws can be made to regulate some religious practices (e.g., human sacrifices, and the Hindu practice of suttee). The Court stated that to rule otherwise, “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government would exist only in name under such circumstances.” In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Free Exercise Clause to the states. While the right to have religious beliefs is absolute, the freedom to act on such beliefs is not absolute.
In Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the Supreme Court required states to meet the “strict scrutiny” standard when refusing to accommodate religiously motivated conduct. This meant that a government needed to have a “compelling interest” regarding such a refusal. The case involved Adele Sherbert, who was denied unemployment benefits by South Carolina because she refused to work on Saturdays, something forbidden by her Seventh-day Adventist faith. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Court ruled that a law that “unduly burdens the practice of religion” without a compelling interest, even though it might be “neutral on its face”, would be unconstitutional.
The need for a compelling interest was narrowed in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), which held no such interest was required under the Free Exercise Clause regarding a law that does not target a particular religious practice. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993), the Supreme Court ruled Hialeah had passed an ordinance banning ritual slaughter, a practice central to the Santería religion, while providing exceptions for some practices such as the kosher slaughter. Since the ordinance was not “generally applicable”, the Court ruled that it needed to have a compelling interest, which it failed to have, and so was declared unconstitutional.
In 1993, the Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), seeking to restore the compelling interest requirement applied in Sherbert and Yoder. In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the Court struck down the provisions of RFRA that forced state and local governments to provide protections exceeding those required by the First Amendment, on the grounds that while the Congress could enforce the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a constitutional right, the Congress could not impose its own interpretation on states and localities. According to the court’s ruling in Gonzales v. UDV (2006), RFRA remains applicable to federal laws and so those laws must still have a “compelling interest”.
Freedom of speech
Inscription of the First Amendment (December 15, 1791) in front ofIndependence Hall in Philadelphia
Main articles: Freedom of speech in the United States and United States free speech exceptions
Speech critical of the government
The Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of any federal law regarding the Free Speech Clause until the 20th century. For example, the Supreme Court never ruled on the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, legislation by President John Adams’ Federalist Partyto ban seditious libel; three of the Supreme Court’s justices presided over resulting sedition trials without indicating any reservations.The leading critics of the law, Vice President Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, argued for the Acts’ unconstitutionality based on the First Amendment and other Constitutional provisions. Jefferson succeeded Adams as president, in part due to the unpopularity of the latter’s sedition prosecutions; he and his party quickly overturned the Acts and pardoned those imprisoned by them. In the majority opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. noted the importance of this public debate as a precedent in First Amendment law and ruled that the Acts had been unconstitutional: “Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.”
World War I
During the patriotic fervor of World War I and the First Red Scare, the Espionage Act of 1917 imposed a maximum sentence of twenty years for anyone who caused or attempted to cause “insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United States”. Specifically, the Espionage Act of 1917 states that if anyone allows any enemies to enter or fly over the United States and obtain information from a place connected with the national defense, they will be punished. Hundreds of prosecutions followed. In 1919, the Supreme Court heard four appeals resulting from these cases: Schenck v. United States, Debs v. United States, Frohwerk v. United States, and Abrams v. United States.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes formulated the clear and present danger test for free speech cases.
In the first of these cases, Socialist Party of America official Charles Schenck had been convicted under the Espionage Act for publishing leaflets urging resistance to the draft. Schenck appealed, arguing that the Espionage Act violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. InSchenck v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Schenck’s appeal and affirmed his conviction. This conviction continued to be debated over whether Schenck went against the right to freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing for the Court, explained that “the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”One week later, in Frohwerk v. United States, the court again upheld an Espionage Act conviction, this time that of a journalist who had criticized U.S. involvement in foreign wars. Both of these cases show that the government can overrule The Bill of Rights with certain acts like The Espionage Act of 1917. It all depends on what was done to put the United States in danger.
In Debs v. United States, the Court elaborated on the “clear and present danger” test established in Schenck. On June 16, 1918, Eugene V. Debs, a political activist, delivered a speech in Canton, Ohio, in which he spoke of “most loyal comrades were paying the penalty to the working class – these being Wagenknecht, Baker and Ruthenberg, who had been convicted of aiding and abetting another in failing to register for the draft.” Following his speech, Debs was charged and convicted under the Espionage Act. In upholding his conviction, the Court reasoned that although he had not spoken any words that posed a “clear and present danger”, taken in context, the speech had a “natural tendency and a probable effect to obstruct the recruiting services”. In Abrams v. United States, four Russian refugees appealed their conviction for throwing leaflets from a building in New York; the leaflets argued against President Woodrow Wilson’s intervention in Russia against the October Revolution. The majority upheld their conviction, but Holmes and Justice Louis Brandeis dissented, holding that the government had demonstrated no “clear and present danger” in the four’s political advocacy.
Justice Louis Brandeis wrote several dissents in the 1920s upholding free speech claims.
The Supreme Court denied a number of Free Speech Clause claims throughout the 1920s, including the appeal of a labor organizer, Benjamin Gitlow, who had been convicted after distributing a manifesto calling for a “revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat”. InGitlow v. New York (1925), the Court upheld the conviction, but a majority also found that the First Amendment applied to state laws as well as federal laws, via the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes and Brandeis dissented in several more cases in this decade, however, advancing the argument that the Free Speech Clause protected a far greater range of political speech than the Court had previously acknowledged. In Whitney v. California (1927), in which Communist Party USA organizer Charlotte Anita Whitney had been arrested for “criminal syndicalism”, Brandeis wrote a dissent in which he argued for broader protections for political speech:
Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
In Herndon v. Lowry (1937), the Court heard the case of African American Communist Party organizer Angelo Herndon, who had been convicted under the Slave Insurrection Statute for advocating black rule in the southern United States. In a 5–4 decision, the Court reversed Herndon’s conviction, upholding Holmes’ “clear and present danger” test for the first time and arguing that the state of Georgiahad not demonstrated that Herndon’s actions met this standard.
In 1940, Congress enacted the Smith Act, making it illegal to advocate “the propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force and violence”.The statute provided law enforcement a tool to combat Communist leaders. After Eugene Dennis was convicted in the Foley Square trial for attempting to organize a Communist Party, he petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. In Dennis v. United States (1951), the Court upheld the law, 6–2.[a] Chief Justice Fred M. Vinsonrelied on Holmes’ “clear and present danger” test as adapted by Learned Hand: “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil’, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as necessary to avoid the danger.” Clearly, Vinson suggested, clear and present danger did not intimate “that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited.” In a concurring opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter proposed a “balancing test”, which soon supplanted the “clear and present danger” test:
The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process.
In Yates v. United States (1957), the Supreme Court limited the Smith Act prosecutions to “advocacy of action” rather than “advocacy in the realm of ideas”. Advocacy of abstract doctrine remained protected while speech explicitly inciting the forcible overthrow of the government was punishable under the Smith Act.
During the Vietnam War, the Court’s position on public criticism of the government changed drastically. Though the Court upheld a law prohibiting the forgery, mutilation, or destruction of draft cards in United States v. O’Brien (1968), fearing that burning draft cards would interfere with the “smooth and efficient functioning” of the draft system,the next year, the court handed down its decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), expressly overruling Whitney v. California. Now the Supreme Court referred to the right to speak openly of violent action and revolution in broad terms:
[Our] decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not allow a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or cause such action.
Brandenburg discarded the “clear and present danger” test introduced in Schenck and further eroded Dennis. In Cohen v. California (1971), the Court voted 5–4 to reverse the conviction of a man wearing a jacket reading “Fuck the Draft” in the corridors of a Los Angeles County courthouse. Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in the majority opinion that Cohen’s jacket fell in the category of protected political speech despite the use of an expletive: “one man’s vulgarity is another man’s lyric.”
In Talley v. California (1960), the Court struck down a Los Angeles city ordinance that made it a crime to distribute anonymous pamphlets. Justice Hugo Black wrote in the majority opinion: “There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression . . . . Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.” In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995),the Court struck down an Ohio statute that made it a crime to distribute anonymous campaign literature. However, in Meese v. Keene (1987), the Court upheld the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, under which several Canadian films were defined as “political propaganda”, requiring their sponsors to be identified.
Main article: Campaign finance reform in the United States
U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell, plaintiff in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court reviewed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related laws, which restricted the monetary contributions that may be made to political campaigns and expenditure by candidates. The Court affirmed the constitutionality of limits on campaign contributions, stating that they “serve[d] the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion.” However, the Court overturned the spending limits, which it found imposed “substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech.”
The court again scrutinized campaign finance regulation in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003). The case centered on the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), a federal law that imposed new restrictions on campaign financing. The Supreme Court upheld provisions which barred the raising of soft money by national parties and the use of soft money by private organizations to fund certain advertisements related to elections. However, the Court struck down the “choice of expenditure” rule, which required that parties could either make coordinated expenditures for all its candidates, or permit candidates to spend independently, but not both, which the Court agreed “placed an unconstitutional burden on the parties’ right to make unlimited independent expenditures.” The Court also ruled that the provision preventing minors from making political contributions was unconstitutional, relying on Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (2007), the Court sustained an “as applied” challenge to BCRA, holding that issue ads may not be banned from the months preceding a primary or general election. In Davis v. Federal Election Commission(2008), the Supreme Court declared the “Millionaire’s Amendment” provisions of the BCRA to be unconstitutional. The Court held that easing BCRA restrictions for an opponent of a self-financing candidate spending at least $350,000 of his or her own money violated the freedom of speech of the self-financing candidate.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), the Court ruled that the BCRA’s federal restrictions on electoral advocacy by corporations or unions were unconstitutional for violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), which had upheld a state law that prohibited corporations from using treasury funds to support or oppose candidates in elections did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also overruled the portion of McConnell that upheld such restrictions under the BCRA. In other words, the ruling was considered to hold that “political spending is a form of protected speech under the First Amendment”.
In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014), the Court ruled that federal aggregate limits on how much a person can donate to candidates, political parties, andpolitical action committees, combined respectively in a two-year period known as an “election cycle,” violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
The divisive issue of flag desecration as a form of protest first came before the Supreme Court in Street v. New York (1969). In response to hearing an erroneous report of the murder of civil rights activist James Meredith, Sidney Street burned a 48-star U.S. flag. Street was arrested and charged with a New York state law making it a crime “publicly [to] mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or act [any flag of the United States].” In a 5–4 decision, the Court, relying onStromberg v. California (1931), found that because the provision of the New York law criminalizing “words” against the flag was unconstitutional, and the trial did not sufficiently demonstrate that he was convicted solely under the provisions not yet deemed unconstitutional, the conviction was unconstitutional. The Court, however, “resist[ed] the pulls to decide the constitutional issues involved in this case on a broader basis” and left the constitutionality of flag-burning unaddressed.
The ambiguity with regard to flag-burning statutes was eliminated in Texas v. Johnson (1989). In that case, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag at a demonstration during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas. Charged with violating a Texas law prohibiting the vandalizing of venerated objects, Johnson was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction in a 5–4 vote. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote in the decision that “if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable.” Congress then passed a federal law barring flag burning, but the Supreme Court struck it down as well in United States v. Eichman (1990).A Flag Desecration Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has been proposed repeatedly in Congress since 1989, and in 2006 failed to pass the Senate by a single vote.
Falsifying military awards
While the unauthorized wear or sale of the Medal of Honor has been a punishable offense under federal law since the early 20th century, the Stolen Valor Act made criminal the act of not only wearing, but also verbally claiming entitlement to military awards that a person did not in fact earn. In United States v. Alvarez (2012), the Supreme Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act, ruling that the law violated the right to free speech for the government to punish people for making false claims regarding military service or honors. The decision was a 6–3 ruling, but the six justices in the majority could not agree on a single rationale for it.
Commercial speech is speech done on behalf of a company or individual for the purpose of making a profit. Unlike political speech, the Supreme Court does not afford commercial speech full protection under the First Amendment. To effectively distinguish commercial speech from other types of speech for purposes of litigation, the Court uses a list of four indicia:
1. The contents do “no more than propose a commercial transaction”.
2. The contents may be characterized as advertisements.
3. The contents reference a specific product.
4. The disseminator is economically motivated to distribute the speech.
Alone, each indicium does not compel the conclusion that an instance of speech is commercial; however, “[t]he combination of all these characteristics . . . provides strong support for . . . the conclusion that the [speech is] properly characterized as commercial speech.”
In Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942), the Court upheld a New York City ordinance forbidding the “distribution in the streets of commercial and business advertising matter.”Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Owen Roberts explained:
This court has unequivocally held that streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in their public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.
In Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976), the Court overruled Valentine and ruled that commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection:
What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients . . . . [W]e conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative.
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association (1978), the Court ruled that commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment as much as other types of speech:
We have not discarded the “common-sense” distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech. To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite a dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980), the Court clarified what analysis was required before the government could justify regulating commercial speech:
1. Is the expression protected by the First Amendment? Lawful? Misleading? Fraud?
2. Is the asserted government interest substantial?
3. Does the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted?
4. Is the regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest?
Six years later, the U.S. Supreme Court, applying the Central Hudson standards in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico (1986), affirmed the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s conclusion that Puerto Rico’s Games of Chance Act of 1948, including the regulations thereunder, was not facially unconstitutional. The lax interpretation of Central Hudson adopted by Posadas was soon restricted under 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996), when the Court invalidated a Rhode Island law prohibiting the publication of liquor prices.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), the Supreme Court extended free speech rights to students in school. The case involved several students who were punished for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court ruled that the school could not restrict symbolic speech that did not “materially and substantially” interrupt school activities. Justice Abe Fortas wrote:
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate . . . . [S]chools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students . . . are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.
In Healy v. James (1972), the Court ruled that Central Connecticut State College’s refusal to recognize a campus chapter of Students for a Democratic Society was unconstitutional, reaffirming Tinker.
However, since 1969 the Court has also placed several limitations on Tinker interpretations. In Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986), the Court ruled that a student could be punished for his sexual-innuendo-laced speech before a school assembly and, in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the Court found that school newspapers enjoyed fewer First Amendment protections and are subject to school censorship. In Morse v. Frederick (2007), the Court ruled that schools could, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at school-sponsored events, even events away from school grounds, if students promote “illegal drug use”.
Main article: United States obscenity law
Justice Potter Stewart wrote that while he could not precisely define pornography, “I know it when I see it.”
The federal government and the states have long been permitted to limit obscenity or pornography. While the Supreme Court has generally refused to give obscenity any protection under the First Amendment, pornography is subject to little regulation. However, the definitions of obscenity and pornography have changed over time.
In Rosen v. United States (1896), the Supreme Court adopted the same obscenity standard as had been articulated in a famous British case, Regina v. Hicklin (1868). The Hicklin test defined material as obscene if it tended “to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall”. In the early twentieth century, literary works including An American Tragedy (Theodore Dreiser, 1925) and Lady Chatterley’s Lover (D.H. Lawrence, 1928) were banned for obscenity. In the federal district court case United States v. One Book Called Ulysses (1933), Judge John M. Woolsey established a new standard to evaluate James Joyce’s novel Ulysses (1922), stating that works must be considered in their entirety, rather than declared obscene on the basis of an individual part of the work.
The Supreme Court ruled in Roth v. United States (1957) that the First Amendment did not protect obscenity. It also ruled that theHicklin test was inappropriate; instead, the Roth test for obscenity was “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest”. This definition proved hard to apply, however, and in the following decade, members of the Court often reviewed films individually in a court building screening room to determine if they should be considered obscene. Justice Potter Stewart, in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964), famously stated that, although he could not precisely define pornography, “I know it when I see it”.
The Roth test was expanded when the Court decided Miller v. California (1973). Under the Miller test, a work is obscene if:
(a) . . . ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find the work, as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) . . . the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Note that “community” standards—not national standards—are applied whether the material appeals to the prurient interest, leaving the question of obscenity to local authorities. Child pornography is not subject to the Miller test, as the Supreme Court decided in New York v. Ferber (1982) and Osborne v. Ohio (1990), ruling that the government’s interest in protecting children from abuse was paramount.
Personal possession of obscene material in the home may not be prohibited by law. In Stanley v. Georgia (1969), the Court ruled that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.” However, it is constitutionally permissible for the government to prevent the mailing or sale of obscene items, though they may be viewed only in private. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) further upheld these rights by invalidating the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, holding that, because the act “[p]rohibit[ed] child pornography that does not depict an actual child” it was overly broad and unconstitutional under the First Amendment and that:
First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.
In United States v. Williams (2008), the Court upheld the PROTECT Act of 2003, ruling that prohibiting offers to provide and requests to obtain child pornography did not violate the First Amendment, even if a person charged under the Act did not possess child pornography.
Memoirs of convicted criminals
In some states, there are Son of Sam laws prohibiting convicted criminals from publishing memoirs for profit. These laws were a response to offers to David Berkowitz to write memoirs about the murders he committed. The Supreme Court struck down a law of this type in New York as a violation of the First Amendment in the case Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Board (1991). That statute did not prohibit publication of a memoir by a convicted criminal. Instead, it provided that all profits from the book were to be put in escrow for a time. The interest from the escrow account was used to fund the New York State Crime Victims Board – an organization that pays the medical and related bills of victims of crime. Similar laws in other states remain unchallenged.
Main article: United States defamation law
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote the landmark decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, requiring the demonstration of “actual malice” in libel suits against public figures.
American tort liability for defamatory speech or publications traces its origins to English common law. For the first two hundred years of American jurisprudence, the basic substance of defamation law continued to resemble that existing in England at the time of the Revolution. An 1898 American legal textbook on defamation provides definitions of libel and slander nearly identical to those given byWilliam Blackstone and Edward Coke. An action of slander required the following:
1. Actionable words, such as those imputing the injured party: is guilty of some offense, suffers from a contagious disease or psychological disorder, is unfit for public office because of moral failings or an inability to discharge his or her duties, or lacks integrity in profession, trade or business;
2. That the charge must be false;
3. That the charge must be articulated to a third person, verbally or in writing;
4. That the words are not subject to legal protection, such as those uttered in Congress; and
5. That the charge must be motivated by malice.
An action of libel required the same five general points as slander, except that it specifically involved the publication of defamatory statements. For certain criminal charges of libel, such as seditious libel, the truth or falsity of the statements was immaterial, as such laws were intended to maintain public support of the government and true statements could damage this support even more than false ones. Instead, libel placed specific emphasis on the result of the publication. Libelous publications tended to “degrade and injure another person” or “bring him into contempt, hatred or ridicule”.
Concerns that defamation under common law might be incompatible with the new republican form of government caused early American courts to struggle between William Blackstone’s argument that the punishment of “dangerous or offensive writings . . . [was] necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty” and the argument that the need for a free press guaranteed by the Constitution outweighed the fear of what might be written. Consequently, very few changes were made in the first two centuries after the ratification of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) fundamentally changed American defamation law. The case redefined the type of “malice” needed to sustain a libel case. Common law malice consisted of “ill-will” or “wickedness”. Now, a public officials seeking to sustain a civil action against a tortfeasor needed to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that there was actual malice. The case involved an advertisement published in The New York Times indicating that officials in Montgomery, Alabamahad acted violently in suppressing the protests of African-Americans during the civil rights movement. The Montgomery Police Commissioner, L. B. Sullivan, sued the Times for libel, stating that the advertisement damaged his reputation. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the $500,000 judgment against the Times. Justice Brennan suggested that public officials may sue for libel only if the publisher published the statements in question with “actual malice”—”knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” In sum, the court held that “the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity).”
While actual malice standard applies to public officials and public figures, in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps (1988), the Court found that, with regard to private individuals, the First Amendment does “not necessarily force any change in at least some features of the common-law landscape.” In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) the Court ruled that “actual malice” need not be shown in cases involving private individuals, holding that “[i]n light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern . . . the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.'” In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), the Court ruled that a private individual had to prove actual malice only to be awarded punitive damages, but not to seek actual damages. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988), the Court extended the “actual malice” standard to intentional infliction of emotional distress in a ruling which protected parody, in this case a fake advertisement in Hustler suggesting that evangelist Jerry Falwell’s first sexual experience had been with his mother in an outhouse. Since Falwell was a public figure, the Court ruled that “importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern” was the paramount concern, and reversed the judgement Falwell had won against Hustler for emotional distress.
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990), the Court ruled that the First Amendment offers no wholesale exception to defamation law for statements labeled “opinion”, but instead that a statement must be provably false (falsifiable) before it can be the subject of a libel suit. Nonetheless, it has been argued that Milkovich and other cases effectively provide for an opinion privilege. In consequence a significant number of states have enacted state opinion privilege laws.
State constitutions provide free speech protections similar to those of the U.S. Constitution. In a few states, such as California, a state constitution has been interpreted as providing more comprehensive protections than the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has permitted states to extend such enhanced protections, most notably in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins. In that case, the Court unanimously ruled that while the First Amendment may allow private property owners to prohibit trespass by political speakers and petition-gatherers, California was permitted to restrict property owners whose property is equivalent to a traditional public forum (often shopping malls and grocery stores) from enforcing their private property rights to exclude such individuals. However, the Court did maintain that shopping centers could impose “reasonable restrictions on expressive activity”. Subsequently, New Jersey, Colorado, Massachusetts and Puerto Rico courts have adopted the doctrine; California’s courts have repeatedly reaffirmed it.
Freedom of the press
Main article: Freedom of the press in the United States
The Free Press Clause protects the right of individuals to express themselves through publication and dissemination of information, ideas and opinions without interference, constraint or prosecution by the government. This right was described in Branzburg v. Hayes as “a fundamental personal right” that is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. In Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes defined “press” as “every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion”. This right has been extended to media including newspapers, books, plays, movies, and video games. While it is an open question whether people who blog or use social media are journalists entitled to protection by media shield laws, they are protected equally by the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause, because both clauses do not distinguish between media businesses and nonprofessional speakers. This is further shown by the Supreme Court consistently refusing to recognize the First Amendment as providing greater protection to the institutional media than to other speakers. For example, in a case involving campaign finance laws the Court rejected the “suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same communication by” non-institutional-press businesses.
A landmark decision for press freedom came in Near v. Minnesota (1931), in which the Supreme Court rejected prior restraint (pre-publication censorship). In this case, the Minnesota legislature passed a statute allowing courts to shut down “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspapers”, allowing a defense of truth only in cases where the truth had been told “with good motives and for justifiable ends”. In a 5–4 decision, the Court applied the Free Press Clause to the states, rejecting the statute as unconstitutional. Hughes quoted Madison in the majority decision, writing, “The impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press”.
The leak of the Pentagon Papers byDaniel Ellsberg (pictured here in 2006) led to New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), a landmark press freedom decision.
However, Near also noted an exception, allowing prior restraint in cases such as “publication of sailing dates of transports or the number or location of troops”. This exception was a key point in another landmark case four decades later: New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), in which the administration of President Richard Nixon sought to ban the publication of the Pentagon Papers, classified government documents about the Vietnam War secretly copied by analyst Daniel Ellsberg. The Court found, 6–3, that the Nixon administration had not met the heavy burden of proof required for prior restraint. Justice Brennan, drawing on Near in a concurrent opinion, wrote that “only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an evil kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order.” Justices Black and Douglas went still further, writing that prior restraints were never justified.
The courts have rarely treated content-based regulation of journalism with any sympathy. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo(1974), the Court unanimously struck down a state law requiring newspapers criticizing political candidates to publish their responses. The state claimed that the law had been passed to ensure journalistic responsibility. The Supreme Court found that freedom, but not responsibility, is mandated by the First Amendment and so it ruled that the government may not force newspapers to publish that which they do not desire to publish.
Content-based regulation of television and radio, however, have been sustained by the Supreme Court in various cases. Since there is a limited number of frequencies for non-cable television and radio stations, the government licenses them to various companies. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the problem of scarcity does not allow the raising of a First Amendment issue. The government may restrain broadcasters, but only on a content-neutral basis. In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Communications Commission’s authority to restrict the use of “indecent” material in broadcasting.
State governments retain the right to tax newspapers, just as they may tax other commercial products. Generally, however, taxes that focus exclusively on newspapers have been found unconstitutional. In Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936), the Court invalidated a state tax on newspaper advertising revenues, holding that the role of the press in creating “informed public opinion” was vital. Similarly, some taxes that give preferential treatment to the press have been struck down. In Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland (1987), for instance, the Court invalidated an Arkansas law exempting “religious, professional, trade and sports journals” from taxation since the law amounted to the regulation of newspaper content. In Leathers v. Medlock (1991), the Supreme Court found that states may treat different types of the media differently, such as by taxing cable television, but not newspapers. The Court found that “differential taxation of speakers, even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas.”
In Branzburg v. Hayes (1972), the Court ruled that the First Amendment did not give a journalist the right to refuse a subpoena from a grand jury. The issue decided in the case was whether a journalist could refuse to “appear and testify before state and Federal grand juries” basing the refusal on the belief that such appearance and testimony “abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment”. The 5–4 decision was that such a protection was not provided by the First Amendment. However, a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell, in which he stated that a claim for press privilege “should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.”, has been frequently cited by lower courts since the decision.
Petition and assembly
Main articles: Right to petition in the United States and Freedom of assembly
Chief Justice Morrison Waite ruled in United States v. Cruikshank that the right of assembly was a secondary right to the right to petition.
The Petition Clause protects the right “to petition the government for a redress of grievances”. This includes the right to communicate with government officials, lobbying government officials and petitioning the courts by filing lawsuits with a legal basis. The Petition Clause first came to prominence in the 1830s, when Congress established the gag rule barring anti-slavery petitions from being heard; the rule was overturned by Congress several years later. Petitions against the Espionage Act of 1917 resulted in imprisonments. The Supreme Court did not rule on either issue.
In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that the right to petition encompass “the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.” Today thus this right encompasses petitions to all three branches of the federal government—the Congress, the executive and the judiciary—and has been extended to the states through incorporation. According to the Supreme Court, “redress of grievances” is to be construed broadly: it includes not solely appeals by the public to the government for the redressing of a grievance in the traditional sense, but also, petitions on behalf of private interests seeking personal gain. The right not only protects demands for “a redress of grievances” but also demands for government action. The petition clause includes according to the Supreme Court the opportunity to institute non-frivolous lawsuits and mobilize popular support to change existing laws in a peaceful manner.
In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011), the Supreme Court stated regarding the Free Speech Clause and the Petition Clause:
It is not necessary to say that the two Clauses are identical in their mandate or their purpose and effect to acknowledge that the rights of speech and petition share substantial common ground . . . . Both speech and petition are integral to the democratic process, although not necessarily in the same way. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. Beyond the political sphere, both speech and petition advance personal expression, although the right to petition is generally concerned with expression directed to the government seeking redress of a grievance.
The right of assembly was originally distinguished from the right to petition. In United States v. Cruikshank (1875), the Supreme Court held that “the right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or duties of the National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.” Justice Morrison Waite’s opinion for the Court carefully distinguished the right to peaceably assemble as a secondary right, while the right to petition was labeled to be a primary right. Later cases, however, paid less attention to these distinctions.
In two 1960s decisions collectively known as forming the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,[b] the Court established that the right to petition prohibited the application of antitrust law to statements made by private entities before public bodies: a monopolist may freely go before the city council and encourage the denial of its competitor’s building permit without being subject to Sherman Act liability.
Freedom of association
Further information: Freedom of association
Although the First Amendment does not explicitly mention freedom of association, the Supreme Court ruled, in National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama (1958), that this freedom was protected by the Amendment and that privacy of membership was an essential part of this freedom. The U.S. Supreme Court decided in Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) that “implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment” is “a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends”. In Roberts the Court held that associations may not exclude people for reasons unrelated to the group’s expression, such as gender.
However, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995), the Court ruled that a group may exclude people from membership if their presence would affect the group’s ability to advocate a particular point of view. Likewise, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), the Court ruled that a New Jersey law, which forced the Boy Scouts of America to admit an openly gay member, to be an unconstitutional abridgment of the Boy Scouts’ right to free association.
Bill of Rights 1689
Censorship in the United States
Freedom of thought
Free speech zones
List of amendments to the United States Constitution
List of United States Supreme Court cases involving the First Amendment
Marketplace of ideas
Photography is Not a Crime
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom
1. Jump up^ Justice Tom C. Clark did not participate because he had ordered the prosecutions when he was Attorney General.
2. Jump up^ Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc (1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington (1965)
1. Jump up^ “First Amendment”. Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute. Archived from the original on May 3, 2013. Retrieved May 3, 2013.
2. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, pp. 6–7.
3. Jump up^ Beeman 2009, pp. 341–43.
4. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, pp. 7–10.
5. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 2.
6. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 10.
7. Jump up^ “Bill of Rights”. National Archives. Archived from the original on April 4, 2013. Retrieved April 4, 2013.
8. Jump up^ “The New United States of America Adopted the Bill of Rights: December 15, 1791”. Library of Congress.Archived from the original on April 4, 2013. RetrievedApril 4, 2013.
9. Jump up^ “Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists – The Final Letter, as Sent on January 1, 1802”. Library of Congress. Retrieved 13 February 2014.
10. ^ Jump up to:a b Eugene Volokh. “First Amendment”.Encyclopaedia Britannica. Archived from the original on April 11, 2013. Retrieved April 11, 2013.
11. Jump up^ Daniel L. Driesbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between Church and State NYU Press 2002, unpaginated.
12. Jump up^ Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
13. Jump up^ Grumet, at 703
14. ^ Jump up to:a b c “BOROUGH OF DURYEA, PENNSYLVANIA, et al., PETITIONERS v. CHARLES J. GUARNIERI”. Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School. 20 June 2011. Retrieved26 August 2013.
15. Jump up^ Edward Mannino: Shaping America: the Supreme Court and American society, University of South Carolina Press, 2000; p. 149; Daniel L. Driesbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between Church and State NYU Press 2002, unpaginated; Chap. 7.
16. Jump up^ “In the words of [Thomas] Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of separation between church and State.” from theEverson decision
17. Jump up^ Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference?, Oxford University Press, 2010.
18. Jump up^ “Excerpts From Ruling on Use of Education Money”.The New York Times. June 11, 1998. Archived from the original on May 3, 2013. Retrieved May 3, 2013.
19. ^ Jump up to:a b Kritzer, H. M.; Richards, M. J. (2003). “Jurisprudential Regimes and Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases”. Law & Society Review 37: 827–840.doi:10.1046/j.0023-9216.2003.03704005.x.
20. Jump up^ Freedom of Religion
21. Jump up^ For the Endorsement test see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
22. Jump up^ For the coercion test see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
23. Jump up^ Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
24. ^ Jump up to:a b David Shultz. Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court. Infobase Publishing. p. 144. RetrievedDecember 31, 2007. Accommodationists, on the other hand, read the establishment clause as prohibiting Congress from declaring a national religion or preferring one to another, but laws do not have to be shorn of morality and history to be declared constitutional. They apply Lemon only selectively because “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being” as Justice DOUGLAS wrote in ZORACH V. CLAUSON. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
25. Jump up^ Warren A. Nord. Does God Make a Difference?.Oxford University Press. Retrieved December 31, 2007.First Amendment Politics: At the risk of oversimplifying a very complicated situation, I suggest that conservative justices tend to favor a weak reading of both the Free Exercise and Establishment clause, while liberals tend to favor strong readings. That is, conservative justices have been less concerned about the dangers of establishment and less concerned to protect free exercise rights, particularly of religious minorities. Liberals, by contrast, have been opposed to any possibility of a religious establishment and they have been relatively more concerned to protect the free exercise rights of minorities.
26. Jump up^ Robert Devigne. Recasting Conservatism: Oakeshott, Strauss, and the Response to Postmodernism. Yale University Press. Retrieved December 31, 2007.Conservatives claim that liberals misinterpret the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment. They point to the opinion written for the Supreme Court by Hugo Black in Everson v. Board of Education: “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: neither a state nor a Federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over another.” The establishment clause, conservatives insist, precludes the national state from promoting any religious denomination but does not prohibit state governments and local communities from developing policies that encourage general religious beliefs that do not favor a particular sect and are consistent with the secular government’s goals.
27. Jump up^ “Reynolds v. United States – 98 U.S. 145 (1878)”. Justia US Supreme Court Center.
28. Jump up^ “Cantwell v. Connecticut – 310 U.S. 296 (1940)”. Justia US Supreme Court Center. Retrieved 25 August2013.
29. Jump up^ Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
30. Jump up^ Richard E. Morgan (January 1, 2000). “Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963)”. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. – via HighBeam Research(subscription required). Retrieved April 19, 2013.
31. Jump up^ Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
32. Jump up^ Richard E. Morgan (January 1, 2000). “Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972)”. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. – via HighBeam Research(subscription required). Retrieved April 19, 2013.
33. Jump up^ Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
34. Jump up^ John G. West, Jr. (January 1, 2000). “Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith 484 U.S. 872 (1990)”. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. – via HighBeam Research(subscription required). Retrieved April 19, 2013.
35. Jump up^ Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508U.S. 520 (1993)
36. Jump up^ “Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah 1993”. Supreme Court Drama: Cases that Changed America. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). January 1, 2001. Retrieved April 19, 2013.
37. Jump up^ City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
38. Jump up^ Steven A. Engel (October 1, 1999). “The McCulloch theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the original understanding of section 5”.The Yale Law Journal. – via HighBeam Research(subscription required). Retrieved April 19, 2013.
39. Jump up^ Gonzales v. UDV, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
40. Jump up^ “Freedom of Religion”. American Law Yearkbook. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). January 1, 2006. Retrieved April 19, 2013.
41. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 15.
42. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, pp. 16–17.
43. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 20.
44. ^ Jump up to:a b New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254(1964)
45. Jump up^ Sullivan, at 276
46. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 53.
47. Jump up^ “Espionage Act, 1917”. National Archives. Retrieved27 March 2014.
48. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 25.
49. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, pp. 25–27.
50. Jump up^ Abrams 2006, pp. 65–66.
51. Jump up^ Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
52. Jump up^ Stone, Geoffrey (2004). Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism. W. W. Norton and Company.ISBN 0393058808.
53. Jump up^ Schenck, at 52
54. ^ Jump up to:a b Jasper 1999, p. 23.
55. Jump up^ Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
56. Jump up^ Debs, at 213
57. Jump up^ Debs, at 216
58. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 27.
59. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 108.
60. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 24.
61. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, pp. 34–35.
62. Jump up^ Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)
63. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 36.
64. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 26.
65. Jump up^ 18 U.S.C. § 2385
66. Jump up^ Dennis, at 497
67. Jump up^ Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
68. ^ Jump up to:a b Jasper 1999, p. 28.
69. Jump up^ Dennis, at 510
70. Jump up^ Dennis, at 509
71. Jump up^ Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)
72. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 29.
73. Jump up^ United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
74. Jump up^ 50a U.S.C. § 462
75. Jump up^ O’Brien, at 379
76. Jump up^ Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
77. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 32.
78. Jump up^ Brandenburg, at 447
79. Jump up^ Brandenburg, at 450–1
80. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 124.
81. Jump up^ Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
82. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 46.
83. Jump up^ Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
84. Jump up^ Chiger, Stephen J. (June 1, 2002). “Cybersmear: telecommunication’s 200-year-old riddle”.Communications and the Law. – via HighBeam Research(subscription required). Retrieved April 11, 2013.
85. Jump up^ McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S.334 (1995)
86. Jump up^ Biskupic, Joan (October 13, 1994). “Court Hears Case on Unsigned Leaflets”. The Washington Post. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). RetrievedApril 11, 2013.
87. Jump up^ Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987)
88. Jump up^ Kamen, Al (April 29, 1987). “Court Upholds Government Labeling Certain Foreign Films `Propaganda'”. The Washington Post. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). Retrieved April 11, 2013.
89. Jump up^ Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
90. Jump up^ Buckley, at 58
91. Jump up^ Buckley, at 39
92. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, pp. 177–78.
93. Jump up^ McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S.93 (2003)
94. Jump up^ McConnell, at 213
95. Jump up^ Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)
96. Jump up^ Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724(2008)
97. Jump up^ Samuel Gedge (June 22, 2009). “‘Wholly foreign to the First Amendment’: the demise of campaign finance’s equalizing rationale in Davis v. Federal Election Commission”. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). Retrieved April 11, 2013.
98. Jump up^ Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. ___ (2010)
99. Jump up^ Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.652 (1990)
100. Jump up^ See Part III of the Opinion of the Court in Citizens United
101. Jump up^ “Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission”,SCOTUSblog, n.d. Retrieved November 1, 2012.
102. Jump up^ McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. ___ (2014)
103. Jump up^ Howe, Amy (April 2, 2014). “Divided Court strikes down campaign contribution caps: In Plain English”.SCOTUSblog. Retrieved April 11, 2014.
104. Jump up^ Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969)
105. Jump up^ Street, 394 U.S. 576, 578 (1969) (quoting the New York Penal Law, §1425, subd. 16)
106. Jump up^ Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
107. Jump up^ Street, at 581
108. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 43.
109. Jump up^ Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
110. Jump up^ Johnson, at 414
111. Jump up^ United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)
112. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, pp. 43–44.
113. Jump up^ Hulse, Carl and Holusha, John (June 27, 2006).”Amendment on Flag Burning Fails by One Vote in the Senate”. The New York Times. Archived from the original on April 4, 2013. Retrieved April 4, 2013.
114. Jump up^ See Notes to 18 U.S.C. § 704, citing 42 Stat. 1286. Retrieved on June 30, 2012.
115. Jump up^ Pub.L. 103-322, The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 320109 (page 318 of the PDF version). Retrieved on June 30, 2012.
116. Jump up^ Crewdson, John (May 27, 2008). “Fake claims of war heroics a federal offense”. Chicago Tribune.
117. Jump up^ Albright, Logan (June 28, 2012). “The Supreme Court that no one is talking about”. The Daily Caller. Retrieved 31 May 2013.
118. Jump up^ United States v. Alverez, Slip Opinion No. 11–210, Argued February 22, 2012—Decided June 28, 2012, Supreme Court of the United States.
119. Jump up^ Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products, 463 U.S. 60 (1983)
120. Jump up^ Bolger, at 67
121. Jump up^ Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)
122. Jump up^ Valentine, at 53
123. Jump up^ Valentine, at 54
124. Jump up^ Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
125. Jump up^ Virginia State Pharmacy Board at 773
126. Jump up^ Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447(1978)
127. Jump up^ Ohralik, at 455
128. Jump up^ Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
129. Jump up^ Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)
130. Jump up^ 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484(1996)
131. Jump up^ Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
132. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 61.
133. Jump up^ “Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District”. Retrieved April 11, 2013.
134. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 62.
135. Jump up^ Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
136. Jump up^ Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
137. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, pp. 62–63.
138. Jump up^ Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)
139. Jump up^ Kozlowski, Dan V.; Bullard, Melissa E.; Deets, Kristen (April 1, 2009). “Uncertain Rights: Student Speech and Conflicting Interpretations of Morse v. Frederick”.Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). RetrievedApril 11, 2013.
140. Jump up^ Regina v. Hicklin,  L. R. 3 Q. B. 360
141. Jump up^ Rosen, at 43
142. ^ Jump up to:a b c “Obscenity”. Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School. August 19, 2010. Archived from the original on April 10, 2013. Retrieved April 10, 2013.
143. Jump up^ Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
144. Jump up^ Roth, at 489
145. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, pp. 135–36.
146. Jump up^ Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)
147. Jump up^ Jacobellis, at 197
148. Jump up^ Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
149. Jump up^ Miller, at 39
150. Jump up^ New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)
151. Jump up^ Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)
152. Jump up^ Ferber, at 761
153. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, p. 51.
154. Jump up^ Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
155. Jump up^ Stanley, at 565
156. Jump up^ Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234(2002)
157. Jump up^ Free Speech Coalition, at 240
158. Jump up^ Free Speech Coalition, at 253
159. Jump up^ United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)
160. Jump up^ Opinion of the Court in Williams
161. Jump up^ Craig King (June 1, 2009). “Protecting children speech that crosses the line”. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). Retrieved April 11, 2013.
162. Jump up^ Madeleine Brand (July 22, 2004). “Interview: Julie Hilden discusses laws and ethics surrounding the intellectual property rights of prisoners”. NPR – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). RetrievedApril 28, 2013.
163. Jump up^ Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S.105 (1991)
164. Jump up^ “Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board 1991”. Supreme Court Drama: Cases That Changed America. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). 2001. Retrieved April 10,2013.
165. Jump up^ Newell 1898, pp. 37–41.
166. ^ Jump up to:a b Newell 1898, pp. 33–37.
167. ^ Jump up to:a b Nelson 1994, p. 93.
168. Jump up^ Sullivan at 280
169. Jump up^ Jasper 1999, pp. 9–10.
170. Jump up^ “New York Times v. Sullivan”. The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. Retrieved 11 March2014.
171. Jump up^ Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 363 (S.D. N.Y. 1984)
172. Jump up^ Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767(1988)
173. Jump up^ Hepps at 775
174. Jump up^ Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472U.S. 749 (1985)
175. Jump up^ Greenmoss at 761
176. Jump up^ “Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985)”. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). January 1, 2000. Retrieved April 19, 2013.
177. Jump up^ Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
178. Jump up^ Leonard W. Levy (January 1, 2000). “Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.”. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). Retrieved April 19, 2013.
179. Jump up^ Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)
180. Jump up^ “Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 1988”. Supreme Court Drama: Cases that Changed America. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). January 1, 2001. Retrieved April 19, 2013.
181. Jump up^ Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990)
182. Jump up^ “Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 497 U.S. 1 (1990)”.Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). January 1, 2000. Retrieved April 19, 2013.
183. Jump up^ Esward M. Sussman, Milkovich revisited: “Saving” the Opinion Privilege, Duke Law Journal, pp. 415-448
184. Jump up^ Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74(1980)
185. Jump up^ Gregory C. Sisk (January 1, 2009). “Returning to the PruneYard: the unconstitutionality of state-sanctioned trespass in the name of speech”. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Property. – via HighBeam Research(subscription required). Retrieved April 19, 2013.
186. Jump up^ Pruneyard, at 94
187. Jump up^ Mulligan, Josh (2004). “Finding A Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns, and the Promise of Pruneyard”. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 13: 533, 557. ISSN 1069-0565.
188. Jump up^ Empresas Puertorriqueñas de Desarrollo, Inc. v. Hermandad Independiente de Empleados Telefónicos,150 D.P.R. 924 (2000).
189. Jump up^ Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013 (2001); Costco Companies, Inc. v. Gallant, 96 Cal. App. 4th 740 (2002); Fashion Valley Mall, LLC, v. National Labor Relations Board, 42 Cal. 4th 850 (2007)
190. ^ Jump up to:a b “First Amendment: An Overview”. | Wex Legal Dictionary / Encyclopedia. Legal Information Institute of the Cornell University. Retrieved 18 April 2014.
191. ^ Jump up to:a b McConnell, Michael W. (November 2013).”Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case”. The Yale Law Journal. 123 2013-2014 (2 November 2013 Pages 266-529). Retrieved 19 April2014.
192. Jump up^ 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
193. Jump up^ Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
194. Jump up^ Lovell, at 452
195. Jump up^ Adam Liptak (June 27, 2011). “Justices Reject Ban on Violent Video Games for Children”. The New York Times. Archived from the original on April 19, 2013. Retrieved April 19, 2013.
196. Jump up^ Mataconis, Doug (May 28, 2013). “Bloggers, Media Shield Laws, And The First Amendment”. Outside The Beltway. Retrieved August 9, 2013.
197. Jump up^ Eugene Volokh (Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law at Los Angeles School of Law of the University of California. “The American Heritage Foundation’s Guide to the Constitution: Freedom of Speech and of the Press”. The American Heritage Foundation. Retrieved18 April 2014.
198. ^ Jump up to:a b Eugene Volokh (8 January 2014). “First Amendment (United States Constitution)”. Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 18 April 2014.
199. Jump up^ See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) where the U.S. Supreme Court “draw no distinction between the media respondents and” a non-institutional respondent.
200. Jump up^ See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the press gets no special immunity from laws that apply to others, including those—such as copyright law—that target communication.
201. Jump up^ See also Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (per curiam) (applying Sullivan standard to a statement by an arrestee); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67–68 (1964) (applying Sullivan standard to statements by an elected district attorney); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286 (applying identical First Amendment protection to a newspaper defendant and individual defendants).
202. Jump up^ First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.765 (1978)
203. Jump up^ Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
204. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 43.
205. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, pp. 44–45.
206. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, pp. 46–47.
207. Jump up^ New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713(1971)
208. Jump up^ Frederick Schauer (January 1, 2000). “New York Times Co. v. United States 403 U.S. 713 (1971)”.Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). RetrievedApril 19, 2013.
209. Jump up^ Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.241 (1974)
210. Jump up^ Dennis Hevesi (February 2, 2010). “Dan Paul, 85, leading lawyer for press freedom”. The Boston Globe. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). Retrieved April 19, 2013.
211. Jump up^ Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
212. Jump up^ Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
213. Jump up^ Lewis 2007, p. 46.
214. Jump up^ Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221(1987)
215. Jump up^ Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991)
216. Jump up^ Leathers, at 453
217. Jump up^ Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
218. Jump up^ Branzburg, 667
219. Jump up^ “Branzburg v. Hayes 408 U.S. 665 (1972)”.Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). January 1, 2000. Retrieved April 19, 2013.
220. ^ Jump up to:a b c d “Rights of Assembly & Petition – First Amendment U.S. Constitution – Findlaw”. findlaw.com. Retrieved October 5, 2012.
221. ^ Jump up to:a b “Frequently Asked Questions – Petition”. First Amendment Center. Archived from the original on April 19, 2013. Retrieved April 19, 2013.
222. ^ Jump up to:a b Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)
223. Jump up^ Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 2488 (2011)
224. Jump up^ United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)
225. Jump up^ Cruikshank, at 552
226. Jump up^ William Cooney (January 1, 2003). “Competition and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine: When should political activity be barred under European community competition law?”. The George Washington International Law Review. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). Retrieved April 19, 2013.
227. Jump up^ National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
228. Jump up^ Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Freedom of Association to Freedom of The Association, 36 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 5 (2012).
229. Jump up^ “National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama 1958”. Supreme Court Drama: Cases That Changed America. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). January 1, 2000. Retrieved April 13, 2013.
230. Jump up^ Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609(1984)
231. Jump up^ Shiffrin, Seana Valentine (January 1, 2005). “What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?”.Northwestern University Law Review. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). Retrieved April 13, 2013.
232. Jump up^ Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
233. Jump up^ “Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, And Bisexual Group of Boston 515 U.S. 557 (1995)”. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. – via HighBeam Research(subscription required). January 1, 2000. Retrieved April 13,2013.
234. Jump up^ Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
235. Jump up^ “Boy Scouts of America v. Dale”. Gender Issues and Sexuality: Essential Primary Sources. – via HighBeam Research (subscription required). January 1, 2006. Retrieved April 13, 2013.
Abrams, Floyd (April 4, 2006). Speaking freely. Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-303675-3. Retrieved April 4, 2013.
Beeman, Richard (2009). Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution. Random House. ISBN 978-1-58836-726-6. Retrieved April 4, 2013.
Jasper, Margaret C. (1999). The Law of Speech and the First Amendment. Oceana Publications. ISBN 978-0-379-11335-8. Retrieved April 4, 2013.
Nelson, William Edward (1994). Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830. University of Georgia Press.ISBN 978-0-8203-1587-4. Retrieved April 19, 2013.
Newell, Martin L. (1898). The Law of Libel and Slander in Civil and Criminal Cases: As Administered in the Courts of the United States of America. Callaghan. RetrievedApril 19, 2013.
Lewis, Anthony (2007). Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-01819-2.
Curtis, Michael Kent (2000). Free Speech, “The People’s Darling Privilege”: Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History. Duke University Press.ISBN 0822325292.
Daniel L. Dreisbach and Mark David Hall. The Sacred Rights of Conscience: Selected Readings on Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations in the American Founding.Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Press, 2009.
Daniel L. Dreisbach, Mark David Hall, and Jeffry Morrison. The Forgotten Founders on Religion and Public Life Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009.
Thomas I. Emerson, “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 72, no. 5 (1963), pp. 877–956. In JSTOR.
Godwin, Mike (2003). Cyber Rights: Defending Free Speech in the Digital Age. MIT Press. ISBN 0262571684.
P. Irons, A People’s History of the Supreme Court New York: Penguin, 1999.
McLeod, Kembrew; Lawrence Lessig (foreword) (2007). Freedom of Expression: Resistance and Repression in the Age of Intellectual Property. University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 0816650314. Cite uses deprecated parameter |coauthors= (help)
Kabala, James S., Church-State Relations in the Early American Republic, 1787-1846. London: Pickering and Chatto, 2013.
J. Kilman and G. Costello (eds.), The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation. (2000).
Lewis, Anthony (2007). Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment. Basic Books. pp. 173–176. ISBN 978-0-465-03917-3.OCLC 173659591.
Nicholas P. Miller, The Religious Roots of the First Amendment: Dissenting Protestants and the Separation of Church and State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Nelson, Samuel P. (2005). Beyond the First Amendment: The Politics of Free Speech and Pluralism. The Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0801881730.
1791 in American politics
1791 in law
Amendments to the United States Constitution
Christianity and law in the 18th century
First Amendment to the United States Constitution
Freedom of religion in the United States
Book proposals can be as long as 50 pages. So the would-be author may want to begin work before getting a response to the query letter from a publisher or agent.
The book proposal must meet an even higher standard than the query letter. It will be competing with hundreds of others for an agent’s or publisher’s time and resources. Agents and publishers often specify components they want to see in a book proposal – slant on the subject matter, marketing analysis, outline, and sample chapter are some; make sure your proposal follows these guidelines to the letter.
Allow your hired writer time to create the book proposal. Give your writer sample chapters, outlines and any other materials you have assembled or written. Then give feedback on a first draft, but be open to the professional’s ideas.
Likely, considering the competition, a book proposal will be turned down at first. Try to figure out why. Let your writer re-craft the proposal for the second and subsequent efforts. Re-crafting is often the process that leads to eventual success. Ascension Center Church
Statement of Faith
We share Eucharist as sacrament for our worship of the divine and believer’s share thanksgiving and that God has no religion!
We pray to the source of the divine encounters in us all with God within and God Without as Source of all things.
We choose to worship in our own homes with symbols, rituals, and sacred ceremonies.
We choose gatherings as our Ascension Church Internet Radio to share the views, opinions, and the word of our own consciousness.
We do share Christianity as Christ Consciousness and share the basics Do Unto Others and that God is love and is in the beginning was the word and the word was without form.
We believer’s share spirit and call upon spirit and share that we are spiritual and are believer’s in Christianity as Christ Consciousness.
We believe our ancient ancestors had religions which spread throughout the world we honor as our home and we respect the cosmos as that which is the all.
We believe God The Father, Goddess the Sacred Holy Spirit of Mother and in all things both Father and Mother. We believe that alien civilizations exist and that there is extraterrestrial life in the cosmos.
We share the universe, metaverse, multiverse, xenoverse, omniverse, alphaverse, and Omegaverse as the seven levels of the cosmos.
We share the seven levels of the rainbow colors which coordinate with the seven levels in our bodies as the chakra system used in tantra for healing and health.
We believer’s share health and prosperity for all.
We believe as non-essential supporters for those who choose to congregate and to form peace movements as a God Given right and follow the laws of the land.
We believers share the international level as health and prosperity for all as spiritual beings and we share we are all cosmos beings and immortal souls.
We believers share we are who we have been waiting for as the l in We.
We believer’s share that we understand the ancient wisdom and new thought teachings that we are all on our own spiritual path.
We believer’s share the statement of faith of the universal life metaphysical church.
We believer’s share the Native American Indians believer’s of the Holy Spirit and the Great white Father and the White Brotherhood as older terms for the same spirit in us all.
We believe there are reality levels of consciousness in both positive and negative energy we have too extreme levels as -o and + o or zero being the all and in the beginning the dot theory and all to the left is minus on the linear time line and all that is to the right is positive on the linear time line.
We believe in the circle of life that is never ending and that we share knowledge of the all that is, was, and will be. We take a metaphysical approach to science and technology.
We believe in “Laying on of Hands”, We believe touching has a healing quality and that new born babies need touch and we carry this belief through life into adulthood.
We share the Native American Traditions and Rights of Passage including the out-of- body experiences and right of passage from teen to adult and all levels of life into the silver years of our elders.
We believe in love, hugs, and teachings of how to be good partners in life.
We believe in art, culture, education, science, technology, history, folklife, and rituals, sacred sacreme
We know that in order to be a body of a church that is founded with incorporation in the United States of America we must follow the laws of the land and file for a 501C3 status as a not for profit church organization and have a federal identification filed as Ascension Center Organization.
We understand by law for a church to be formed we must have articles of incorporation and by-laws and a statement of faith and practices.
We Ascension believer formed from our dreams . Ascension Christians are of the metaphysicians who follow close to the ancient ones with a new ascension age twist of consciousness with memories. We adopt for the Christians ion Life Fellowship Church. We believe all is energy of the source and describe our souls as that we each have.
We share that we are body-ind-spirit is our faith ind-spirits sharing the birth-life-death process and share a philosophy of phenomenology and that spirit guides each of us with a direct connection to source as GOD the word with a big G. We share that their has been the rule of God Kings and Queens throughout the universal order.
We share the divine source in the creation known on earth as the United States of America.
Rarely do we get to know, see, and share the presence of higher exalted beings we define as extraterrestrials but know they do exist in our belief system. The hierarchy with levels of extraterrestrial beings on the linear time line. All is one and one is all in the as above so below spirit of all things including animal, mineral, plant and all creation.
We choose to worship with prayer and meditation and join the East and West with ancient scriptures and texts found of our ancient alien astronauts as stories with the understanding as far as we can interpret correctly including the Bible of King James, The books not in the Bible of King James Version and other scriptures as we rewrite our history knowing we do not have all the history written as much was lost so we do not try to accept a literal meaning.
We have an annual gathering and webinars with our Ascension Center International Radio broadcast on Sundays with studies of our Wednesday night meetings in keeping with traditions of time in space of the elders of our churches formed in America by the protestants who came to America and joined with the Native American Indians. We are those who share with bringing the ative American Indians beliefs together with our own to be formed into accepting all others as brothers and sisters of the game of life and we ask to be joined and sign our names as such in the book of life with our own confessions which is good for the soul. We proclaim the rights of the regular healings we find in worship with this statement of faith joined with the old ways with our own new thought teaching as of the love and light as lightworkers and truthseekers.
We are Lightworkers & Truthseekers and we share healing with crystals, and some believe in the healing qualities of plant life and ingesting substances for future insights and for qualities of spiritual raising consciousness and healing past lives and the future of our procreation and sacred ceremonies including tantra rituals performed as one’s own sacred path.
Life partners, and seekers of companionship and fellowship is found to be important to our belief system. How we choose to engage in healing ceremonies whether laying on of hands for faith healing or exorcism of demons for faith healing does require touching of the physical body when agreed upon by two consenting adults over the age of eighteen years of age..
We form the ACE Metaphysical Institute and share the divine encounters spoken of in ancient history. We accept that we can think for ourselves and choose to believe in the executive, judicial and legislative branches of our country called the United State of America. We follow the laws of our country and address ourselves now as universal citizens. We believe in civil rights.
We are law abiding citizens and share Nature’s God as our ancestors proclaimed. We defend our Constitution of the United States of America, and of Declaration of Independence from our enemies both foreign and domestic. We believe in the Amendments and voting. We celebrate the holidays in America and share in expressions of celebration, worship, and healing praise.
Statement of Faith and Practices
The following is a statement of our position of basic Christian doctrines. Note: There are certain basic Christian truths about which there must be agreement. On all other doctrines there should be LIBERTY. In ALL things there must be LOVE as mentioned in 1 Corinthians 13:1-13. It is our resolution to take an uncompromising stand on the essential doctrines of the Faith, and extend the right hand of fellowship to all who hold to them. It is also our resolution to protect the liberty of Christians to hold different perspectives on the non-essential doctrines.
Note: There are doctrines we may consider non-essential, but which are important. We therefore make known our belief on these, while presenting them with TOLERANCE toward those who may hold a different position. We are committed to truth and accuracy in doctrine, but also understand that one can hold right doctrines and still do damage to the body of Christ by causing divisions over the non-essentials. We therefore just as committed to the essential Christian character, believing that, in all things there must be love. As Paul the apostle stated, “The goal of our instruction is love, from a pure heart and a sincere faith” (1 Tim 1:5). That, too, is our goal and commitment as we promote the following teachings that we hold as truth:
On the Person of Jesus Christ
Jesus Christ is the Word (Logos) of God. The Word was with God in the Beginning, which states His pre-existence as one with God (John 1:1). By Him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth (Col 1:16), therefore making Him the Creator. Jesus Christ is the Purpose of God found in all creation. He is the Father’s delight and desire, and the Father is looking for the reflection of His Son in all created things (Heb 1:3). Jesus is the Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End (Rev 1:8). In the beginning, it was (and still is) the ultimate purpose of God for all things to be summed up in Christ (Eph 1:4-10).
Jesus Christ, Who pre-existed with God in the form of God, emptied Himself to become fully a man (Phil 2:6-9) that He might be the propitiatory (stand-in and only) sacrifice for the sins of mankind (Heb 2:17, 1 John 2:2). Through His propitiatory sacrifice made on the cross, all who believe in (trust in) Him and His sacrifice have their sins remitted (forgiven) and are restored to fellowship with God lost by man’s transgression (John 3:16, Rom 5:18-19, Rom 10:9-11). Jesus was born of a virgin, by the seed of the Holy Spirit (Matt 1:20-23, Luke 1:35). His virgin birth is a testimony that only the Spirit can beget that which is Spirit. Those of the new creation are not solely of human origin, but are born from above by the Holy Spirit (2 Cor 5:17, John 3:5-7). The resurrection of Jesus’ physical body after His crucifixion was literal (Matt 28:1-10), as will be the resurrection of both the just and the unjust on the Day of Judgment (Heb 6:1, Heb 9:27, Acts 24:15, 2 Cor 5:9-11).
There is only one God and one mediator between God and man, the Man Christ Jesus (1 Tim 2:5). All who seek restoration and fellowship with God must go through the Lord Jesus Christ and cannot approach God through any other work, person, church, spirit or doctrine (John 14:6). It is also a supreme presumption for any person or institution to seek to be mediator for others in place of the Lord Jesus Himself.
We believe that man was created by God from the dust of the earth (Gen 2:7), without sin or the knowledge of good or evil (Gen 3:22, Rom 5:12). The first man, Adam (1 Cor 15:45), transgressed the command of God (Rom 5:19), and as God had warned (Gen 2:16-17), the process of death entered him and all of his descendants because of that transgression (Rom 5:12-21). Therefore, all have sinned and are worthy of the sentence of death (Rom 3:23).
Because of original sin and our unrighteousness, we are unable to approach a Holy God, except through the atoning sacrifice (shed blood) of Jesus Christ (Rom 3:21-28, Eph 1:7). Through Jesus and His atoning sacrifice (Rom 5:1-2), we not only can come before the Throne of Grace (Rom 10:12), but we may approach it boldly (Heb 4:16, Heb 10:19) since our confidence is not in our religious performance and good works (Rom 3:23), but in the Lord Jesus and His atoning sacrifice. (Phil 3:3, Rom 8:1).
On the Atonement
Because all have sinned (Rom 3:23, Eccl 7:20) and are therefore under the sentence of death (Rom 5:12-21), all must trust in the atoning sacrifice of Jesus for the remission (forgiveness) of sins (Heb 9:22, Eph 1:7, 1 John 1:7, 1 John 2:2). There is no other way to reconcile with God or escape from eternal judgment, except through the propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ (Rom 3:21-26, Rom 5:8-9, Heb 9:11-15).
On the New Birth
Believing in our hearts that Jesus is the Son of God and in His propitiation made for our salvation is a part of the regeneration and renewal process that constitutes our new birth into a new creation (2 Cor 5:17). Although this does not imply immediate perfection in our temporal life or lifestyle, it does mean that true faith will result in a “radical” change in us (James 2:14-20).
Being “born again” implies a new beginning, not an ending. Christian maturity in faith, truth and life is a process. Even so, this process must begin with spiritual regeneration or new birth (John 3:3, Titus 3:4-7). While it is possible to change our behavior without regeneration, changing our hearts requires the new birth, and it is our hearts upon which God looks (Rom 8:27).
On the Purpose of Faith
True faith is of the heart (Rom 10:8-10) and not just the mind (Acts 8:37). God’s purpose in requiring faith for salvation is to raise our focus and concentration above the temporal to the One who is eternal (2 Cor 4:16-18). Therefore, the gospel that is able to save souls must be preached in the power of the Spirit of God (1 Cor 2:1-5). The gospel is not dependent upon human eloquence or persuasion that may change minds, but cannot change hearts.
On the Authority of Scripture
We believe in the Divine inspiration and authority of the 66 books of the Holy Bible as the canon of God’s testimony to mankind. We are committed to esteeming Scripture as the very Word of God, inerrant in its original form. We do not accept any doctrine which contradicts Scripture (2 Tim 3:16). We understand there are other books and scriptures that may not have made it into the original King James version.
We understand that there are many practices and doctrines that are considered orthodox, which do not contradict the Scriptures, but which are not directly addressed in His Word. We are committed to giving liberty in the belief and practice of these teachings (2 Cor 3:17), but we will endeavor to maintain the simplicity of the biblical testimony and its stated practices as we are given grace to perceive them.
We do not accept any spiritual experience as having its source in the Holy Spirit that does not have a precedent in Scripture. We do not accept any revelation, vision, dream, prophesy or discernment as truth, which contradicts Scripture, or cannot be verified by it. We do not believe that any other writings have the same authority as the canon of Scripture.
On the Lord’s Supper
We acknowledge the ordinance of the Lord’s Supper in remembrance of Jesus and as a testimony of our communion (common-union) with Him in His body, the Church (Luke 22:19, 1 Cor 11:20-26). We consider it a holy ordinance, but we do not accept the teaching that communion is for the purpose of remitting sins, which Scripture testifies is based solely in the sacrifice of Jesus on the cross (Heb 9:25-28).
On Water Baptism
We believe that water baptism should be by immersion and accomplished as soon as possible after commitment to the Lordship of Jesus Christ and His atoning sacrifice for our sin. This ordinance is a personal and public statement of faith (Matt 10:32), which is the ceremonial act of identifying with our spiritual baptism into the Body of Christ, and Jesus’ death, burial and resurrection (Matt 28:19, Acts 2:38, Rom 6:3-4, 1 Cor 12:13).
On the Church and the Holy Spirit
We believe that those who have “truly” accepted Jesus Christ as their Lord and Savior receive the Gift (Promise) of the Holy Spirit at conversion (Acts 11:17, 2 Cor 1:22-23, Rom 5:5). We also believe that, at conversion, we are sealed with the Holy Spirit of Promise (Eph 1:13-14), and are baptized into the Body of Christ by the Spirit (1 Cor 12:12-13, Titus 3:4-7, 2 Cor 1:21-22), and that our bodies become the temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 6:19-20).
Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is given to “HELP” us be Christlike with divine appointments and spiritual giftings (1 Cor 12:1-11, 2 Cor 1:21-22, John 14:16-18) that enable us to carry out the Great Commission (Matt. 28:19-20). Subsequent to conversion (or after conversion), we believe that all believers should be continually filled over and over again with the Holy Spirit, as evidenced in the Book of Acts, and that continued Holy Spirit experiences/encounters are a part of normal Christianity. (Eph 5:18, 1 Cor 12:13, Acts 4:31, John 7:37).
We also believe that the Holy Spirit performs many necessary ministries/functions in the Believer’s life such as: Counselor/Helper (John 14:16), Teacher (John 14:26), Empower (Acts 1:8), Guide (Rom 8:14), Intercessor (Rom 8:26-27), Giver of Spiritual Gifts (1 Cor 12:11; 1 Cor 14), and the One who produces spiritual fruit in our lives (Gal 5:22-23).
We believe in and accept the Ascension Gifts (Five-fold) ministries of apostles, prophets, pastors, teachers, and evangelists for the perfecting and equipping of the saints (Eph 4:11-16, 1 Cor 12:28, Eph 2:19-20).
On the Second Coming of Christ
We believe in the literal, physical return of the Lord Jesus Christ (Acts 1:11, 2 Thess 2:1-12, Rev 1:7).
We believe that those who are alive and remain at the return of our Lord will be changed and caught up to be with Him in the air. Those who have died in the faith will be resurrected and precede those who are alive in being changed and caught up to be with Him (1 Thess 4:16-17, 1 Cor 15: 51-55).
We believe in the literal, physical resurrection of both the just and the unjust for the Day of Judgment (Acts 24:15, 2 Peter 2:9, 2 Cor 5:10). For those who have been justified by faith in Christ Jesus (Rom 3:28, Rom 5:1, Gal 2:16) and His sacrifice on our behalf, this resurrection is for Eternal Life in fellowship with God. Those who are not justified by faith in Christ Jesus are resurrected for an eternal damnation/punishment (John 3:18, John 5:28-30, Acts 24:15, 2 Peter 2:9, Jude 1:6).
Expressions of Praise, Worship & Celebration
Singing: (Psalm 81:1, Psalm 95:1, Eph 5:18-19)
Dancing: (Psalm 149:3, Psalm 150:4, 2 Sam 6:14, Psalm 30:11
Clapping Our Hands: (Psalm 47:1, Psalm 98:8)
Shouting: Psalm 35:27: (Psalm 47:1, Psalm 98:4)
Making a Joyful Noise: (Psalm 66:1, Psalm 98:4, Psalm 100:1)
Making Music on Instruments: (2 Sam 6:5, Psalm 150)
Lifting Up Holy Hands: (Psalm 63:4, Psalm 134:2, 1 Tim 2:8)
Laughter: (Psalm 126:2, Job 8:21)
Thanksgiving: (Ezra 3:11, Psalm 69:30, Psalm 100:4)
Speaking & Singing in Tongues: (Acts 10:46, 1 Cor 14:2, Eph 5:19)
Standing: (Deut 10:8, 1 Chron 23:30, Neh 9:5)
Kneeling: (Psalm 95:6, Eph 3:14, Phil 2:10)
WE believe in the ASCENSION PROCESS. Duality and the veil we have accepted as a communal “world” which includes cyberspace culture, social media, influences of our parents, art, culture, education, science, technology, history, folklife, environment, world religions, governments, philosophies, psychologies, and peer-pressure.
We share our ascribing to the highest standards of spiritual education.
We share in prayers and meditation to all our souls to ascend. We learn while we are here on planet earth and know we are here to grow our spirits. In today’s modern times we share health and prosperity for all and our philosophy is live and let live. We share the golden rule as live and do unto others as one would have them do unto us.
We believe in tithing 10% for the good of the whole to assist the sick and the poor in the name of God’s Holy Church in the Great Commission and the sharing of Christ Consciousness in us all.